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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A RULE AND AN ORDER IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
IVAN C. RUTLEDGE*
The most comprehensive scheme of regulation of the activities of
administrative agencies of government ever enacted is the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.' Internal evidence in the structure of this legis-
lation indicates that its drafters regarded the difference between rules and
orders as fundamental to this scheme of regulation.2 The purpose of this
study is two-fold: to explore the extent to which this conception is true
under the terms of the Act; and to indicate the nature of the distinction
between a rule and an order.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACr
Six of the twelve sections of the Act disclose explicit differences in
the manner of treating rules and orders: Sections Three, Four, Five, Seven,
Eight and Nine. Of the others, Section Eleven is an addendum to Section
Seven, but Sections One, Two, Six, Ten, and Twelve have no explicit
relationship to differences in procedure between rules and orders. There-
fore Sections Three through Five and Seven through Nine are the most
important sections here.
Promulgation. Section Three regulates the final stage of the adminis-
trative process, the promulgation or service of a final determination. It
applies to both rules and orders.8 No distinction is made between them
so far as they involve functions that require "secrecy in the public interest"
or matters relating to internal agency management, because they are then
exempt from the requirements of the section. Likewise, matters of official
*A.B. 1934, Carson-Newman College; A.M. 1940, LL.B. 1946, Duke University;
Assistant Examiner, Budget Bureau, Washington, D. C., 1942-43; Professor of Law,
Mercer University Law School, 1946-47; Associate Professor of Law, University of Washing-
ton School of Law.
1. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1946), hereinafter referred to as "the
Act" without citation. Likewise the twelve sections of the Act will be referred to only
by section number.
2. Section One is purely formal. Section Twelve deals with legislative matters such
as effective date and relationship of the Act to other legislation. Section Ten does not
concern agency procedure, being the judicial review section. Section Six concerns "ancillary
matters" of agency procedure. Section Two deals with definitions and excludes the
courts, the Congress, governments of territories and possessions, and certain mediation,
military, and temporary agencies from all or most of the procedural requirements of
the Act. However it defines "orders" as final dispositions in any matter other than rule
making. And Section Three, on public information, has three subdivisions: "rules,"
"opinions and orders," and "public records." Section Nine deals with licensing, which
is defined as a type of adjudication, the process for making orders. The remaining five
sections center around Section Four, on rules, and Section Five, on orders, as follows:
Sections Seven and Eight depend for their operation on Sections Four and Five; and
Section Seven incorporates the provisions of Section Eleven.
3. That is, it applies to all final dispositions of any agency in any matter. Unlike
any of the other sections of the Act, it applies to the § 2 mediation, military, and
temporary agencies.
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record do not have to be made available to persons concerned if to do so
would be contrary to the requirements of any statute or if the information
is "for good cause found" held confidential. Otherwise matters of official
record must be made available to persons properly and directly concerned,
and all rules and orders are to be either published or made available to
public inspection. The distinction then comes into play: rules must be
published in the Federal Register or else addressed to and served upon
named persons, while orders are subject only to the general requirement
of publication or availability to inspection in accordance with published
rule; and there is an additional exception in the case of orders not cited
as precedents, which may for good cause be held confidential. Thus when
publication is required, the method of publication is prescribed in greater
detail for rules than for orders, and there is one more exception to the
requirement of publication for orders than for rules.
Formal Notice, Hearing and Determination. The remaining sections
to be considered, Four, Five, and Seven through Nine, regulate agency
proceedings prior to announcement of the final .decision, beginning with
the process of conducting the hearing. Section Four applies only to pro-
ceedings to make rules, while Sections Five and Nine apply only to adjudi-
cation, which is the process by which an order, as defined by the Act, is
made. Sections Four, Five, Seven, and Eight provide a complexity of
procedural requirements that are brought to bear upon a limited class of
agency proceedings in which trial procedure is used. This class of pro-
ceedings is herein described as. "formal" because the procedural standards
of the Act are higher here than for any other agency proceedings. This
class is determined in part by the distinction between rule and order, but
other factors also enter into identification of an agency proceeding as
formal. The criteria may be summarized as follows: the distinction between
rule and order; the procedure that is otherwise by statute required of the
agency; and the subject of the rule or order to be made.
The affirmative characteristic distinguishing formal proceedings is
that the agency is required by statute to employ trial procedure in making
the rule or order.4 That is, it must hold a hearing and make its determina-
tion on the basis of the record of that bearing. The Act itself requires
trial procedure in only one kind of proceeding: the removal of trial exam-
iners appointed in accordance with Section Eleven to preside over hearings.
Thus, generally, identification of a proceeding as formal requires reference
to materials outside the Act, including specific provisions of other statutes,
regardless of whether the proceeding is to make a rule or an order. In
other words, a proceeding is exempt from the formal requirements of the
4. Last sentence of § 4b: "Where rules are required by statute to be made on
the tcord after opportunity for an agency hearing .. " First sentence of § 5: "In
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing .... "
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Act, whether it is adjudication or rule making, unless there is a statutory
requirement that it embody trial procedure.
Notwithstanding the existence of a statutory requirement of trial pro-
cedure, however, there are negative criteria that may remove the proceed-
ing from the class of formal proceedings. Some of them involve the
distinction between rule making and adjudication but others do not. If
the subject of consideration is military, naval, or foreign affairs functions, 6
the proceeding is exempt from the formal requirements of the Act, not-
withstanding the existence of a statutory requirement of trial procedure.
The same is true of selection or, with the exception of removal of trial
examiners noted above, tenure of federal officers or employees. In these
instances the sole criterion is subject matter, regardless of the procedure
otherwise required by statute or the distinction between rule and order.
On the other hand, the distinction between rule and order must be
made in classification of other proceedings (in which trial procedure is
required) as formal. In adjudication, if the agency has certain relationships
to the courts the proceeding may be exempt from formal requirements,
whereas in the case of rules these procedural or structural relationships
are immaterial. These are cases in which the determination of the agency
is subject to redetermination by a court or in which the agency is acting
as agent for a court. Similarly, in the case of orders required to be made
by trial procedure, the formal requirements of the Act are inapplicable if
the decision rests solely on inspections, tests, or elections; but otherwise
in the case of rules. That is, the formal procedure of the Act would have
to be used in making a rule although it was based solely on an inspection,
for example, if some other statute required trial procedure. Finally, a
specific subject in adjudication, but not in rule making, enjoys exemption
from formal procedure under the Act. That subject is the certification
of employee representatives. Conversely, in rule making there are subjects
that enjoy exemption from the formal procedure of the Act notwithstanding
the existence of a statutory requirement of trial procedure. They are public
property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts and (in addition to selection
and tenure of federal officers and employees) any matter relating to agency
management or personnel. The legislative history may indicate that it
was assumed that the statutory requirement of trial procedure should be
attributed more significance in adjudicating concerning these subjects than
in making rules concerning them.,7
5. They are found in the introductory exceptions contained in the first sentences
of § 4 and § 5 respectively.
6. A specific extension of this area was accomplished by an appropriation rider
exempting admission and deportation of aliens from fonnal requirements and ending
the regime of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). Pub. L. No. 843,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. c.3 (Sept. 27, 1950).
7. The Senate judiciary Committee relied upon two factors that would in most
instances exempt these proceedings from formal requirements. It explained that "pension
and benefit proceedings" are not ordinarily required by statute to be made after agency
hearing. The other factor is the exception in favor of matters subject to a subsequent
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The distinction between rule and order is not "fundamental" in identi-
fying the class of formal proceedings. Rather, the common characteristic
is the type of procedure established by statute (other than the Act, save
in one instance) for the particular type of proceeding. That is, the Act
leans more heavily upon special decisions concerning the procedure to be
used in a particular agency function than upon the general distinction
between rules and orders. Likewise a general exemption of certain subjects
is fully as important as the line between rule making and adjudication.
Among the requirements imposed by the Act upon formal proceedings
there is some variation between the adjudication and rule making. In both
classes of formal proceedings the Act amplifies the existing requirement
of a hearing, by specifying the minimal content of the notice that a hearing
is to be held.8 The notice must designate the time, place, and nature of
the proceeding and the authority therefor. In the case of orders it must
contain "the matters of fact and law asserted;" in the case of rules, "either
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved." Notice of rule making may be published in the
Federal Register, or personally served upon all persons "subject thereto,"
or the requirement may be satisfied by actual notice to such persons in
accordance with law. Notice of adjudication is required only to be timely
given to all persons entitled thereto. In adjudication, responsive pleading
is required if private persons are the moving parties; it may otherwise be
required by agency rule. Due regard for the convenience of parties and
representatives in fixing the time and place of bearing is specified for
adjudication, but not for rule making.
Another type of variation within the formal requirements of the Act
occurs. Here the basis of variation is not the distinction between rules and
orders as such, but a grouping of certain kinds of adjudication with rule
making to form sub-classes of formal proceedings. These kinds of adjudi-
cation are: the determination of claims for money or benefits; proceedings
involving the validity or application of rates, facilities or practices of public
utilities or carriers; and the determination of applications for initial licenses.
Initial licensing is bracketed with rule making in connection with
delegation by the agency of the function of presiding at the hearing.9 In
all other adjudication, if the presiding officer (or officers) is not also given
the authority to decide the case as well as preside, the agency must at least
obtain a recommended decision from some officer qualified to preside at
hearings (a member of the agency or a trial examiner qualified under
Section Eleven), before making its own decision. But in rule making and
initial licensing the agency, though it has delegated the conduct of the
trial of the law and the facts de novo in court. SEN. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess., in Legislative -istory, Administrative Procedure Act, SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. p. 22 (1946).
8. Sections 4a and 5a.
9. Last sentence of § 8a.
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hearing, may forthwith make its decision without such recommendation
if it finds upon the record that due execution of its functions makes such
a course unavoidable; or it may take a recommended decision from any of
its "responsible officers;" or it may issue a tentative decision of its own
in lieu of a recommendation from some of its members or subordinate
officers. One significance of this process of using preliminary decisions
is that parties are entitled to take exceptions to them, which may be
supported by reasons, and the agency must rule upon each exception taken.
These decisions and rulings become part of the record, which may in turn
become part of the basis of judicial review of the rule or order.10 Thus,
in initial licensing or rule making the record may have no record of a
preliminary decision (recommended or tentative) with rulings on exceptions
thereto. In these two types of proceedings the agency has greater latitude
about who shall make the preliminary decision than elsewhere in formal
adjudication. It may be made by the agency itself or any of its responsible
officers, whereas otherwise in formal procedure the recommendation must
come from an officer qualified to preside at hearings.
Rule making is grouped with adjudicative proceedings involving the
validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities or
carriers, as well as initial licensing, in connection with who may make the
recommended decision." In all other adjudications the recommendations
must come from officers who preside at the hearings, if they are available,
but in this group of formal proceedings it is not required that the officer
be the one who presided.
There is a similar variation in connection with another method of
delegation in the hearing process. The agency may delegate the making
of the decision so that it does not itself participate in the case except in
the event of appeal to it or review on its own motion. If such a method
of arranging the work-load of the agency is used by the agency, the decision
(called an "initial" decision) may be made by any agency member or trial
examiner qualified under Section Eleven to preside at hearings, whereas
if the proceeding is not rule making or does not involve initial licenses or
public utilities or carriers the officer who presided must decide the case.
Furthermore, except in rule making and in these special types of adjudi-
cation, the qualifications of the hearing examiner and the standards of
his conduct are subject to special restrictions, unless he is a member of
the agency. Besides being qualified under Section Eleven, he must not be
engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions in the case in question or
in any case factually related to it, and lie must not be responsible to or
subject to the supervision of investigative or prosecuting officers or em-
ployees. He must in the conduct of the case avoid ex Parte consultation
and advice, except where authorized by law, and may accept the assistance
10. Section 8b.
11. Section 5c.
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of prosecuting or investigative officers and employees only as witnesses or
counsel in public proceedings. Such requirements do not apply to formal
determinations of rules, initial licenses, or rates, facilities or practices of
public utilities or carriers. Here the agency may delegate the making of
the initial decision to any officer qualified to preside at hearings and such
officer may both prosecute and preside, or both prosecute and decide, but
it is not required that lie both preside and decide.
12
The remaining variation within formal procedure deals with the hearing
process, as distinguished from the process of decision, and combines with
rule making and initial licensing the processing of claims for money or
benefits. In general, formal procedure under the Act involves an oppor-
tunity for each party to present his case or defense by oral as well as docu-
mentary evidence. However, in this sub-class oral presentation may be
omitted unless to do so would prejudice a party to the proceeding. 13
The requirements of formal procedure under the Act include: a defi-
nition of the record of the hearing on which the determination must be
based, along with a provision for official notice of extra-record material facts;
the right to propose findings and conclusions, with the agency duty to
make findings, and give reasons therefor, on all material issues; qualifica-
tions and powers of officers who preside at the reception of evidence, along
with specification of procedures for disqualification; standards for the re-
ception of evidence and its consideration; and regulation of the burden of
proof. In all these requirements there is no variation based upon drawing
a distinction between adjudication and rule making, except as previously
noted. Those exceptions point to a somewhat larger agency discretion in
favor of proceedings to make rules, but this policy is not clear-cut; rather,
rule making seems to be but one kind of proceeding in which this larger
agency discretion is appropriate.
There are a few provisions applicable exclusively to formal adjudication
and not to any type of rule making.' 4 One is the authorization granted to
agencies to issue declaratory orders, in their sound discretion, to terminate
controversies or remove uncertainties. Another is the requirement that
parties be given an opportunity to submit and consider facts, arguments,
offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment, where permitted by time,
the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest. These provisions
seem to be mainly hortatory in effect, because of their conditional phrasing.
On the other hand, the formal requirements are supplemented in the
case of rule making by a provision having to do with promulgation, which
does not apply in formal adjudication.' This is the requirement that the
publication or service of the rule required by Section Three take place at
least thirty days prior to its effective date. However the agency has discre-
12. Ibid.
13. Last sentence of § 7c.
14. Sections 5b and 5d.
15. Section 4e.
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tion to dispense with this requirement "upon good cause found and pub-
lished with the rule." This provision is not applicable to certain kinds of
rules though they are otherwise subject to formal procedure. It does not
apply to adjective rules or to interpretative rules, or to rules that grant or
recognize exemption or relieve restriction, but only to substantive rules.
Another provision, applicable to all formal rule making, but not to adjudi-
cation, is the requirement that any interested person be given the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.' 6
The distinction between rule and order is not so pervasive, as has
been seen, in determining the class of formal proceedings, as is the dis-
tinction between the existence or non-existence of a statutory requirement
of trial procedure. The former distinction is a factor that combines with cer-
tain subjects, such as public benefits, though not with others, such as foreign
affairs, to identify those proceedings as exempt from the formal class. Simi-
larly it parallels other considerations, such as the fact that an applicant seeks
an initial license, to give the agency somewhat greater discretion within the
formal requirements in the conduct of trial procedure than it would otherwise
be allowed. The distinction between rule and order also affects the applica-
bility of provisions with respect to the giving of notice in formal proceedings,
although the respective provisions for rule making and adjudication are
very similar. Finally, the rule formally made is subject to promulgation
requirements wholly inapplicable to the order. So there is an increasing
importance of the distinction, depending upon whether the purpose for
which it is being used is to determine in general what type of procedure
to use, or whether the question is to the mode of handling some particular
detail, such as the place of publication of notice or the timing of promul-
gation. If the question is a matter of detail, the distinction between rule and
order, standing alone, may resolve it.
Semi-Formal Notice, Hearing, and Determination. In general, the
Act lays down more specifications of procedure for rule making than for
adjudication, not only with respect to promulgation in Section Three, and
its timing in relation to effective date in Section Four, but with respect
to the giving of notice of the proceeding, as seen in Section Four. There
is a further set of provisions in Section Four that creates a distinct class of
rule making proceedings. This class resembles formal proceedings in the
criteria that determine it: military, naval and foreign affairs, as well as
internal agency matters are excluded. Also excluded, if the proceeding is
rule making, are public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts. That
is, some of the same criteria of subjects, and subjects combined with the
distinction between rule and order, are applied in identifying this class
of "semi-formal" proceedings as in segregating formal proceedings. How-
ever, no adjudication is included in this class of proceedings, so the distinc-
tion between rule and order is basic. Instead of an existing statutory re-
16. Section 4d.
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quirement of trial procedure, as in formal proceedings, this class is identi-
fied by a statutory requirement of notice or hearing that falls short of
requiring trial procedure. 17
Semi-formal proceedings, then, are proceedings to make rules without
the use of trial procedure, but with some kind of opportunity to participate.
Section Four elaborates the kind of procedure to be employed in this class
of proceedings, just as Sections Four, Five, Seven and Eight elaborate the
content of an existing requirement of a determination on the record of a
hearing, or trial procedure. In semi-formal proceedings, the same provisions
as to the giving of notice and delaying the effective date on promulgation
apply as in formal proceedings. But instead of prescribing the qualifica-
tions of hearing officers, defining the record, and providing how the func-
tions of hearing and deciding may be delegated, Section Four provides for
an opportunity to submit information and opinion, and requires that such
matter must be considered in reaching the decision.
In detail, the requirements specially applicable to semi-formal pro-
ceedings are not numerous. After the notice has been given, "interested
persons" must be accorded a chance to submit data, views or arguments,
though they do not have the right to present them orally. Instead of the
elaborate formal requirements as to consideration of the record exclusively,
and the making of findings and rulings, the agency in this class of proceed-
ings need only give consideration to the relevant matter submitted and
make a concise general statement of the basis and purpose of the rule.' 8
One additional contrast may be drawn between the operation of the
Act in formal and semi-formal proceedings. In formal proceedings there
is only one instance in which the Act requires trial procedure, in the removal
of trial examiners. On the other hand, there is a general requirement of
notice and opportunity to be heard semi-formally. Instead of relying on
existing or future statutory determinations of what kind of procedure an
agency is to use, the Act itself prescribes an opportunity to be heard semi-
formally even in the absence of an existing statutory requirement of notice
or hearing.10
The opportunity to be heard semi-formally conferred by the Act is,
however, available only in limited circumstances. Not only are the subjects
excluded from formal procedure excluded here, as well as all of adjudi-
cation; there are additional kinds of rules that would be subject to semi-
formal procedure if there were an existing statutory requirement of notice
or hearing, but are exempt from the requirement of the Act itself. These
rules are described as "interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
rules of agency organization, procedure or practice."20 So although the Act
requires formal procedure in only one instance in adjudication, and not
17. Last sentence of § 4b.
18. Section 4b.
19. First sentence of § 4a.
20. Last sentence of § 4a.
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at all in rule making, it sets up semi-formal procedure for a certain class
of rules only, and prescribes it for many proceedings by force of its own
requirement alone. That is, notwithstanding the absence of statutory re-
quirement of participation in the proceeding the Act itself supplies it for
substantive rules having the force of law (other than those concerning the
subjects exempt from both formal and semi-formal procedure). However,
the agency has discretion to dispense with semi-formal procedure if re-
quired only by force of.this provision of the Act if also it finds for good
cause that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest. The requirement that semi-formal
procedure be used, notwithstanding the absence of such requirement
aliunde the Act, may be somewhat more than merely hortatory, as shown
by the provision that if the agency exercises its discretion to dispense with
it, the rule must contain the finding of good cause with supporting reasons.21
To recapitulate, if a party has a right to a determination (or a right
to trial procedure) based on the hearing record, the proceeding must be
formal under the Act, whether the agency proposes to make a rule or an
order, with certain exceptions, some of which are based upon the dis-
tinction between rule and order combined with the subject involved, and
some of which are not. The Act itself confers this right only on trial
examiners in cases involving their removal. If "interested persons" have
a right to notice or hearing, but not to trial procedure, the proceeding must
be semi-formal under the Act, but only in rule making that does not
involve certain subjects. The Act itself confers this right generally, in the
area of rule making where semi-formal procedure is applicable, if the rule
is a substantive regulation (as distinguished from a procedural or an
advisory rule). Thus the Act not only specifies procedure in greater detail
in connection with the publication of rules than orders, and not only
does it specify more procedures for formal notice, hearing and determi-
nation in rule making than in adjudication; the Act also establishes a
special procedure applicable only to rules. Furthermore, in connection
with this class of semi-fornal proceedings the Act itself confers a general
right of participation where other legislation does not. The Act has no
comparable procedure or right to participate for adjudication. Thus, in
formal procedure the Act provides greater latitude for the agency, accom-
panied by more elaborate specification of details in rule making than in
adjudication; it also prescribes a procedure for less formal participation in
a limited class of rule making proceedings, while conferring rights of par-
ticipation in such proceedings in many instances where they are not other-
wise conferred by statute; and in both formal and semi-formal proceedings
Section Four supplements the Section Three requirements as to promul-
gation of rules.
Informal Proceedings. The remaining "informal" proceedings consist
21. Ibid.
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of the exceptions previously outlined in identifying formal and semi-formal
proceedings. They include military, naval, and foreign affairs, and selec-
tion and, except for removal of trial examiners, tenure of public officers
and employees. In the case of rules, they also include all other matters of
agency management and personnel, as well as matters relating to public
property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts. In the case of orders, they
also include cases where the agency is acting as agent for a court or the
decision is subject to redetermination by a court, .where the decision rests
solely on inspections, tests, or elections, and cases of certification of employee
representatives. Also in adjudication, a proceeding is informal in the absence
of a statutory requirement of trial procedure; whereas in rule making
(because of the provisions constituting semi-fomal procedure) the pro-
ceeding is informal if there is no statutory requirement of participation by
interested persons amounting to a right to notice or bearing. Thus, the
distinction between rule and order combines with other factors to identify
informal proceedings in the same manner as in the identification of formal
proceedings. However, it is significant in one additional respect, as com-
pared with the determination of the class of formal proceedings: whereas
the requirement of trial procedure is essential to a formal proceeding
whether on a rule or an order, its absence necessarily means informal pro-
cedure only in the case of orders; in the case of rules the proceeding may
not be informal if there is a statutory right to any substantial degree of
participation.22
In the limbo of informal proceedings, only the provisions of Sections
Three, Six, Nine and (outside the agency level of procedure) Ten are
applicable. Section Nine makes special provision for procedure in the
case of some orders, as Section Four provides semi-formal procedure for
some rules. It requires an agency, before terminating the status of a
licensee, to make a final determination of the application for a renewal,
and in other cases to give the licensee an opportunity to demonstrate or
achieve compliance with all lawful requirements.3
From the standpoint of right to participate, the provisions of the Act
operate in one instance on a single type of adjudication (formal removal
of hearing examiners); in another, on a sub-class of rule making (in certain
semi-fonnal proceedings); and in a third, on a sub-class of adjudication
(in the informal proceedings just described). While these requirements
of the Act as to opportunity to participate do not apply to rule making as
22. The agencies and functions exempted in § 2a are at most within § 3 require-
ments, and are not subject to the informal requirements of § 6 and § 9, the semi-formal
requirements of § 4, or the formal requirements of §§ 4, 5, 7, 8 and 11.
23. These opportunities are not available in cases of willfulness, or where public
health, interest or safety requires otherwise. Section 9. It will be noted that opportunity
to achieve, as distinguished from opportunity to demonstrate compliance, is a substan-
tive rather than procedural right. This right seems to assure some "future effect"
(prescribed as an essential characteristic of rules) to certain licensing action, such as
imposing additional qualifications on an outstanding license.
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such nor to adjudication as such, they do single out certain kinds of rules
and orders respectively, rather than applying at once to rule making and
adjudication.
The Section Six requirement of opportunity to participate, like all the
requirements of this section, makes no distinction between rules and orders.
The provision is that any interested person may appear in connection with
any agency function for the adjustment of any controversy or to present
any request, so far as the orderly conduct of public business permits.
With this provision may be compared the Section Four right given inter-
ested persons in connection with rules other than those concerning the
subjects exempt from formal and semi-formal procedure to petition for
issuance, amendment or repeal. The Section Six provision is supported by
another provision that the agency irust answer all written requests in
case of denial, explaining the reasons for the denial. Other Section Six
requirements, applicable alike to rules and orders, have to do with reason-
able proiptness in making determinations (comparable to the Section
Nine licensing requirement phrased in almost identical terms) and with
the rights of parties and witnesses in respect to counsel and compulsion
to appear or submit information. The requirements of Sections Six and
Nine apply independently in formal proceedings also, as do the require-
ments of Section Six in semi-formal proceedings.
Summary. The requirements of the Act that most emphasize the
distinction between rule and order have to do with promulgation. Whether
informal, semi-formal, or formal procedure has been used in the making
of a rule it must be published in the Federal Register unless it is served
upon named persons in accordance with law, or the function involved
requires secrecy in the public interest, or the matter relates solely to
internal agency management. Such publication or service of a substantive
rule must, with certain exceptions, take place at least thirty days before
its effective date. Such rules include all rules made according to formal
or semi-formal procedure or after an agency finding that semi-formal pro-
cedure is unnecessary, impracticable or contrary to the public interest,
except rules granting or recognizing exemptions or relieving restrictions or
interpretative rules and statements of policy. All rules must at least be
published, or in accordance with published rule, be made available to
public inspection, unless secrecy is required in the public interest or the
matter relates solely to internal agency management. On the other hand
orders not cited as precedents may for good cause be held confidential
and not published or made available to public inspection.
The provision of a special procedure for limited participation in the
making of certain rules, and the accompanying general requirement of
adherence to such procedure may be taken as lending great significance
to the distinction between rule and order. The semi-formal procedure
provided by the Act suggests that while for adjudication there may be
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either an elaborate trial procedure or a wide variety of less formal means of
investigation and determination, in rule making there is a middle ground
on which interested persons may enjoy a relatively uniform procedure that
gives them limited participation. The protection of licensed status given
by Section Nine, though it extends to both formal and informal proceed-
ings, emphasizes the distinction between rule and order, since it applies
only to a certain class of orders.
With the exception of Section Nine, the requirements of informal
procedure are indifferent to the distinction, except as it distinguishes
informal from semi-formal and formal proceedings. As previously outlined,
the distinction is significant only when taken with other factors such as
subject matter, the relation of the agency to the courts, and the procedure
otherwise required by statute.
Within the confines of formal procedure a rule may be made with
greater freedom on the part of an agency than an order. However, this
greater latitude is in most instances extended to some types of formal
adjudication along with formal rule making.
In sum, it may be suggested that while rule making is more extensively
regulated by the Act than adjudication, formal adjudication is more inten-
sively regulated than formal rule making. While the processes of hearing
and determination may be conducted in more ways for making rules than
orders, the hearing and determination requirements for rules bulk larger
than those for orders, and in addition the publication of rules is subjected
to more regulation than orders.
MAKING Tim DISTINCTION
The foregoing description, in terms of the requirements of the Act,
of the effect of the difference between rule and order provides a basis for
considering how the distinction may be drawn. The Act itself draws the
distinction by defining as an order the final disposition of any agency in
any matter other than rule making but, as previously indicated, including
licensing. So an order is that which is not a rule. A rule is an agency
statement designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
to describe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any
agency. It may be "of general or particular applicability," but it must
have "future effect. 2 4
The method of definition indicates caution in drawing the line
between rules and orders in that certain determinations are specified as
rules: "The approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, cor-
24. Section 2c. As passed by the Senate the bill read, "of general applicability"
and did not prescribe "future effect." The defintion of "order" (§ 2d) specified that
it might be affirmative, negative, or declaratory in form, but as finally enacted the Act
provides than an order may also be injunctive in form. These changes were made in
the House Committee Report of May 3, 1946. It explained that "injunctive" had to
be added to distinguish certain types of orders "because of the amendment of Section2 (c) to embrace clearly particularized rule making. ." H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong. 2d Sess., app. A, n. 1, op. cit., supra note 7, at 283.
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porate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities,
appliances, services or allowances therefor of valuations, costs, or account-
ing, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing." Likewise, certain
determinations are specified to be orders (grant, renewal, denial, revocation,
suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation amendment, modification
or conditioning of a license), and it is provided that an order may be in
forn either affirmative, negative, injunctive or declaratory. Various kinds
of rules are referred to in other passages: interpretative rules, general state-
ments of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure or practice, sub-
stantive rules, rules granting or recognizing exemptions or relieving
restrictions. Likewise in Section Five, which deals only with adjudication,
reference is made to proceedings involving the validity or application of
rates, facilities or practices of public utilities or carriers.
These illustrative words are reminiscent of such distinctions as are
traditional: that making rates is legislative or rule making, for example. 25
Indeed there is judicial authority that the distinction is not "novel
reasoning" but rather an explanation of existing concepts, that administra-
tive rule making is analogous to the enactment of statutes by the legislature
and administrative adjudication resembles the judicial function.20
Conventionally, legislation is law making and adjudication is the
vindication of existing law, a stage in its enforcement. More specifically,
adjudication consists of "ascertaining" the operative facts in a situation
and thereby equating it to the legal consequences in accordance with the
legal norm delineating the relationship between situations and conse-
quences. In the syllogistic schema, adjudication supplies the minor premise,
selects the major premise and arrives at a conclusion. "The law" furnishes
the major premise (fashioned by the tribunal from rules, standards, etc.)
but the tribunal pronounces the conclusion. This conclusion is usually
considered as a sufficient warrant for the exercise of official coercion,
thus translating the abstract into the concrete, the general into the par-
ticular. If decision without rule is blind, rule without decision is meaning-
less. 2T The process of adjudication classifies the situation by operative
facts, thus interpreting it, but as it reacts upon "the facts" it also reacts
upon "the law" in such a w ay as to interpret it or create new rules in many
instances. Nevertheless, a rule of law is general rather than particular,28
25. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 1908),
26. Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (t Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
860 (1949).
27. ". . .rules without cases are empty and cases without rules are blind." COHEN,
PHILOSOIlY AND LECAL SCIENCE IN LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 227 (1933). Decision
here means the ordering of actual behavior conceived as "subiect to realization by state
force." See 2 WrGMoHE, CASES ON TORTS, app. A, § 3 (1911).
28. See for example HOLLAND, JURIsPRTDnRNCE 22 (9th ed. 1900), where he collects
the observations of Austin, Maine, Bentham, Ulpian, Cicero and Aristotle on the point.
Bentham, in materials more recently brought to light, takes the position that even
orders are general in respect to the persons they are intended "in the last instance" to
favor. He sees three categories, general laws, particular laws and laws partly particular
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and law making is the making of propositions, whereas the main business
of adjudicating is to make dispositions. Even Professor Gray, who empha-
sized the law making function of courts, said: "Again, the function of a
judge is not mainly to declare the Law, but to maintain the peace by
deciding controversies. '' 20
The disposition of a situation by command of the state is not in-
variably subject to adjudication in this sense, however, as shown by this
argument of Lord Digby in the trial of the Earl of Stratford:
I know, Mr. Speaker, there is in Parliment a double Power of Life
and Death by Bill, a Judicial Power, and a Legislative; the
measure of the one, is what's legally just; of the other, what is
Prudentially and Politickly fit for the good and preservation of the
Whole. But these two, under favour, are not to be confounded in
Judgment: We must not piece up want of legality with matter of
convenience, nor the defailance of prudential fitness with a pretense
of Legal Justice.80
Dean Pound finds a different kind of contrast between judicial adju-
dication and administrative disposition of cases, in this remarkably anti-
nominalist passage:
Typically judicial treatment of a controversy is a measuring of it
by rule in order to reach a universal solution for a class of causes
of which the cause at hand is but an example. Typically adminis-
trative treatment of a situation is a disposition of it as a unique
occurrence, an individualization whereby effect is given to its
special rather than to its general features.8 1
On the one hand stands the provision of the "Prudentially and
Politickly fit for the good and preservation of the Whole." On the other,
the disposition of the situation as a unique occurrence. Between them
may be seen the process of adjudication relating the two in cases where
the ordinance of what is fit for the good of the whole takes the form of
a general rule that is thought to be applicable. In such cases the apparently
unique occurence is found, as Dean Pound suggests, to have general
featuxes that make it but an example of a class of causes; or, to turn it
around, the apparently abstract rule is found to be a reflection of the con-
cretely existing situation.8 2
and partly general. Tim LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 161-163 (1945). The
distinction between general and particular is persistent. Fuchs, in Procedure in Admin-
istrative Rule Making, gives as a definition, "the issuance of regulations or the making
of determinations which are addressed to indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons
or situations." 52 HARV. L. Rnv. 259, 265 (1938).
29. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 98 (1909).
30. Quoted in McILWAiN, THE HioH COURT OF PARLIAMENT 153 (1910). This
work demonstrates the historical differentiation of legislation and adjudication as it
developed in the Mother of Parliaments.
31. POUND, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE PmLOSOPHY or LAw 108-9 (1922).
32. This picture points towards the ideal of a government of laws and not of men,
where the law making power sees every situation in advance and classifies it under
general precepts, where retroactive legislation is never needed, and discretion in enforce-
ment is superfluous. But because human generalization produces injustice and inexpe-
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A distinction between legislation and adjudication asserts that "the
former affects the rights of individuals in the abstract and must be applied
in a further proceeding before the legal position of any particular individual
will be definitely touched by it; while adjudication operates concretely upon
individuals in their individual capacity." 3 This distinction is based upon
a temporal analysis that would seem to question whether any retroactive
legislation is law, but it suggests the hierarchy of norms propounded by
Profesor Kelsen. This hierarchy begins with the basic norm, goes down
to the next level, the constitution, then the act of the legislature, and so
on until the sheriff or other officer executes the final sanction by perhaps
seizing the body, goods or land of the delinquent. Between making the
basic norm and executing the final sanction law is in successive stages both
made and executed.34 It is thus possible to visualize successive implementa-
tion of broad imperatives by ever-narrowing ones, accompanied by remote
sanctions progressing to more and more immediate ones. In many instances,
the introduction of administrative powers through special agencies has in-
creased the degree of such elaboration. For example, the prescription of a
reasonable rate rather than an after-the-fact adjudication that a charge under
a given rate was unreasonable implements the general rule prohibiting
unreasonable rates with specific rates approved as reasonable. It also adds
to the general warning against unreasonable or discriminatory charges a
more specific disapproval of particular schedules proposed, before more
immediate sanctions accrue. Such extension or elaboration of the progres-
sion of rule making and sanctions renders the line between legislation and
adjudication more tenuous than in the case of a, statute under which the
first proceeding following enactment is initiated by a private party or public
prosecutor in court.
Another kind of law making is the creation of jurisdiction to dispose
of individual situations without benefit of rules, or under very vague stan-
dards. Such jurisdiction may be assumed by the legislature, as in private
relief acts or legislative divorces, or may be conferred on the legislature
by specific constitutional provision, as in the case of impeachment and
trial of public officers. It is perhaps most frequently created in the executive
dience, individualization without prior precept, such as the olic prosequi discretion, is
tolerated under such limitations as judicial review and the election of public officers.
33. DIcxNsoN, ADMINISTRATIVZ JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw 21 (1927).
But sometimes the rights of individuals are found to be sufficiently affected by legislation
alone to make a constitutional question justiciable. For example, Connecticut Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
34. "A norm regulating the creation of another norm is 'applied' in the creation of
the other norm. Creation of law is always application of law." KELsEN, GEN1ERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 133 (1945). Sed quaere, whether law is made by a judge
if he considers the rule to be clear and the only question to be the credibility of a
certain witness (in the pure sense of existential fact). It seems that norm-creation would
in such a case have ended before the judicial process began, at least unless the sanction
imposed were individually tailored for the particular defendant. But it is questionable
whether, even so, the phrase "individual norm" is allowable.
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branch, as in the case of prison terms under indeterminate-sentence statutes,8 5
or temporary confinement of aliens; 0 but such jurisdiction is familiar in
judicial administration, as for example in setting the amount of punishment
for criminal contempt, or suspending sentence in criminal cases. In some
instances the creation of such jurisdiction is intended to make possible
the development of general rules by a case-to-case approach, but the in-
stances mentioned above seem to be best classifiable as instances in which
discretion is the only rule. In other instances, rule making power accom-
panies the power to dispose of specific cases, as where courts have the
power not only to dispose of procedural points but to make rules of pro-
cedure. It has been held that the coexistence of both types of power in
an agency does not justify requiring it to use the rule making power prior
to application in a specific case87  It seems that in descending scale
legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts have discretion to impose
novel requirements not foreshadowed by previous legal materials, whether
in their propositions or in their dispositions. Perhaps in ascending scale
they are bound to make their individual dispositions succeed each other
in a pattern that gives rise to generalization, and to explain them on the
basis of rules considered as pre-existing.
Disposing of a situation as a unique occurrence by giving effect to its
special rather than its general features is, then, not confined to adminis-
trative agencies, but occurs in courts and in legislatures. Nowadays, except
for private bills, legislatures seldom essay to dispose of particular situations,
partly because of constitutional restrictions;38 but rather they provide
more or less general rules or grant jurisdiction to make such rules or to
make individual dispositions, or a combination of the three may have
occurred. Generally, the function of courts is considered as that of making
individual dispositions under rule or standard, to the extent that rule or
standard is provided; and it is recognized as the proper, and in most instances
necessary, function of a court to enunciate (to find or to make) such law
as supports its conclusion, even in the absence of previously established
rules and standards. But courts are not generally conceived to be charged
with the responsibility of otherwise developing general precepts for the
disposition of particular cases, or of making individual dispositions without
35. State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 66 P.2d 360 (1937).
36. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 288 (1896).
37. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). After having mistakenly selected
a supposed rule or standard of equity to govern the disposition, 318 U.S. 80 (1943),
the Commission acted again to reach the same result under its statutory authority, so
that the major premise was no more than a standard, perhaps nearer the pole of discre-
tion to decide individually within the jurisdiction granted, than the pole of application
of rule to facts. A jurisdiction may be located so near the discretionary pole as to be
classified as legislative or administrative and consequently be improperly exercisable under
judicial power, though it deals with dispositions rather than propositions, e.g., denying a
license to a radio station. Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464
(1930).
38. See PATmTEsON, IN RODUCTION TO JUsRISRUDENCE 80-81 (4th ed. 1951).
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standard or general rules. In these two respects the traditional distinction
between legislation "proper" and adjudication "proper" falls short in supply-
ing guidance for discriminating between administrative rule making and
administrative making of orders.
A conceptual difficulty inheres in the distinction between "general"
and "particular." When does a controversy involve the making of, or choice
among, general rules and when is the question one of determining whether
or not a given situation exists for which a given set of consequences is to be
set in motion? A possible distinction is that between a command addressed
to, or operating upon, an indefinite or indeterminate class, and a command
issued to an individual or definite group. Another is the distinction between
a permanent or continuing command as distinguished from one that creates
a duty that can be discharged by a single act or a limited course of conduct.
Professor Gray said that "it seems a trifling matter on which to spend much
thought."39
Nevertheless, the distinction between rule and order has a degree of
significance in the application of requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. The process of interpreting language by the consequences of
its application has a question-begging flavor, but the contextual approach
to the problem cannot be ignored, and it should not be overlooked that the
distinction was drawn with a purpose. In other words, it is submitted that
the principle of polarity suggests that "nile" and "order" are within the
same "field-concept" and conceptualism should yield to judgment of conse-
quences in their application.40
Thus, when the order issued by an agency is not to contribute to a
general rule by being cited as a precedent, it may for good cause be held
confidential; since it does not serve the law-making function in this way,
reasons otherwise present for publication are absent. On the other hand,
when there is substantial need for the public at ]east to be able to inspect
an agency directive, even though it is addressed to and served upon named
persons, it may be proper to classify it as a rule and require the agency to
39. OP. cit. supra note 29, § 348. Gray and Fuchs (supra note 28) accept either
distinction. Austin attacked Blackstone for rejecting the distinction based on acts rather
than persons bound. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 97 (4th ed. 1874). But it is doubtful
that Blackstone excluded acts as a basis. 1 BL. COMM. 126 n. 15 (Hammond's ed.
1999). Dean Hammond nevertheless argues for persons rather than acts as the
basis of the distinction, as does Professor Patterson, op. cit. supra note 38 at 78-79. And
the court, in the Wilapoint Oysters case, supra note 26 at 682, contrasted "situations"
in rule making with particular persons in adjudication.
40. An excellent suggestion from legislative history is made by Ginnane: "Signifi-
cantly, while the definitions of 'rule' and 'order' were being drastically rewritten, the
principal operating Sections-4, 5, 7 and 8-remained largely untouched. This suggests
that the definitions were adjusted in order to fit the operating provisions to the needs
of various agency functions, and that the rationalization of the definitions lies in the
impact of those provisions upon various types of such functions." "Rule Making,"
"Adjudication" and Exemptions under the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 621, 627 (1947). The court referred to the twilight zone intermediating "the
poles of clarity" of rule making and adjudication, where "the doctrine of primary pur-
pose controls." Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26 at 676, 683.
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make it available for inspection in accordance with published rule. Where
the 'agency is required to use formal procedure, but the subject, though
not in such an area as foreign affairs, is appropriately considered under
the "institutional decision ' '41 approach it may follow that the determina-
tion is a rule. The propriety of having a responsible officer other than the
one who presided at the hearing recommend a decision, or of having the
agency issue a tentative decision, may influence classification of the deter-
mination as a rule rather than an order. Or, if the agency should fail to
invite submittals from interested persons and otherwise grant semi-formal
procedure, it is possible that the determination should be considered an
order, even though it does not involve a subject like public contracts.
The perhaps surprising addition of "particular applicability" as a
possible characteristic of a rule emphasizes the fluidity of the distinction
between rules and orders. It also recognizes, as does the listing of prices,
wages, corporate structures, and the like, how determinations nominally
made respecting some juristic person like a corporation or association are
effective as general decisions of "what is Prudentially and Politickly fit for
the good and preservation of the whole.' 42 The lack of precision in the
distinction between rule making and adjudication is at once minimized in
its effect and paralleled in its function by the various exemptions from
procedural requirements in the Act based on other factors. The responsi-
bilities and functions of administrative agencies are so diverse that a
uniform procedure for them is probably in the realm of unworkable theory.
It is not surprising that the compromise with such theory represented by
the Administrative Procedure Act resulted in a complicated scheme. But
contrasting generalizations, such as the words "rule" and "order" them-
selves symbolize, are flexible enough to relieve against difficulties created
by efforts to provide for uniformity in instances where the factual basis for
it is lacking.
42. SuPra note 30.
41. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw c. 8 (1951).
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APPENDIX
TABULAR SUMMARY OF INVESTICATION AND DETERMINATION REQUIREMENTS
A. INVESTIGATION
The letters in the table refer to requirements summarized below.
"Benefactory" adjudication means processing applications for initial licenses
or claims for money or benefits.
Section 2-A
Agencies and
Proceedings
None
Informal
Proceedings
A
B
C & C,
D
E
F
FORMAL PROCEEDING
Semi-Formal Rule Adjudication
Proceedings Making Benefactory Non-Benefactory
A A A A
B B B B
C & CI C & C' C C
D D D D
E E E E
F
01 G G2 02
H1 H2 12 H2
I I I
A. Acts or demands must be authorized by law. Section 6.
B. Right to retain or obtain a copy or inspect the record-evidence com-
pulsorily obtained. Section 6.
C. Right to appear in person-interested persons. Section 6.
1. Right to petition for issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule. Sec-
tion 4d.
D. Right to counsel-parties and persons compelled to appear. Section 6.
E. Right to use of agency subpoenas-parties. Section 6.
F. Right to demonstrate compliance with requirements-licensees. Sec-
tion 9.
G. 1. Notice of hearing, manner of service, content. Section 4a.
2. Notice of hearing to parties, content, pleading requirements, pre-
hearing opportunity for consent adustments. Section 5.
H. 1. Opportunity to participate by submission of written data, views,
arguments-interested persons. Section 4b.
2. Right to present case, defense, and rebuttal by oral as well as docu-
mentary evidence-parties. Section 7c.
I. Exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, unduly repetitious evidence, and
right to cross-examine-parties. Section 7c.
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B. DETEDIMINATION
Section 2-A FORMAL PROCE EDI NG
Agencies Semi- A D J U D I C A T I O N
and Informal Formal Rule Initial Pub. Utility
Proceedings Proceedings Proceedings Making Licensing or Carrier Misc.
None A A A A A A
B B B B B B
B1 B1  B1  B1
C
* D D
El E2  E2  E2 E2
F1  F2 F2 F2 F2
G G G G
C1  G' G2 G a
A. Notice and explanation of denial of request-interested persons. Sec-
tion 6.
B. Reasonable dispatch in concluding any matter presented. Section 6.
1. Reasonable dispatch in processing license applications. Section 9.
C. Finding of good cause and brief statement of reasons for dispensing
with notice and public procedure in substantive rule making that has
the effect of law. Section 4a.
1). Finding of good cause for foreshortening promulgation notice, in case
of substantive rules having effect of law and neither granting exemp-
tion nor relieving of restriction. Section 4c. (*Applicable in Informal
only when C applies.)
E. 1. A concise general statement of the basis and purpose of any rule
adopted. Section 4b.
2. Right to submit proposed findings and conclusions, to take excep-
tion to preliminary decisions, to submit reasons in support of
proposals and exceptions, and to have rulings thereon, and rulings
on every material is one of law, fact, or discretion presented on the
record, and reasons for such rulings. Section 8b.
F. 1. Consideration of all relevant matter submitted, but without being
confined to consideration of such matter. Section 4b.
2. The reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole
record to be the exclusive basis for decision, the moving party
having the burden of proof in absence of contrary provision. Sec-
tion 7.
G. Regulated qualifications and prescribed powers of officers who preside
at the reception of evidence. Section 7.
1. Restrictions upon delegating the reception of evidence; require-
ment, except in emergencies, of initial, recommended, or tentative
decisions. Section 8a.
2. Restrictions upon delegating the reception of evidence; requirement
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of initial or recommended decisions made by officers qualified to
preside. Sections 5c and 8a.
3. Restrictions upon delegating the function of receiving evidence;
requirement of initial or recommended decisions by presiding offi-
cers insulated from investigative or prosecuting functions, and from
ex farte consultation. Section 5c.
